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This paper studies information exchange in collaborative group activities involving mixed
networks of people and computer agents. It introduces the concept of “nearly decom-
posable” decision-making problems to address the complexity of information exchange
decisions in such multi-agent settings. This class of decision-making problems arise in set-
tings which have an action structure that requires agents to reason about only a subset
of their partners’ actions – but otherwise allows them to act independently. The paper
presents a formal model of nearly decomposable decision-making problems, NED-MDPs,
and deﬁnes an approximation algorithm, NED-DECOP that computes eﬃcient information
exchange strategies. The paper shows that NED-DECOP is more eﬃcient than prior col-
laborative planning algorithms for this class of problem. It presents an empirical study
of the information exchange decisions made by the algorithm that investigates the extent
to which people accept interruption requests from a computer agent. The context for the
study is a game in which the agent can ask people for information that may beneﬁt its
individual performance and thus the group’s collaboration. This study revealed the key fac-
tors affecting people’s perception of the beneﬁt of interruptions in this setting. The paper
also describes the use of machine learning to predict the situations in which people devi-
ate from the strategies generated by the algorithm, using a combination of domain features
and features informed by the algorithm. The methodology followed in this work could form
the basis for designing agents that effectively exchange information in collaborations with
people.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Settings in which computer systems and people collaborate are becoming increasingly prevalent, arising in a wide variety
of application domains (e.g, hospital care-delivery systems, systems administration applications) as well as in virtual reality
and simulation systems (e.g, disaster relief, military training). A common characteristic of such collaborations is that task-
related information is distributed among the group members. As a result, an agent may come to know something useful for
another participant that is not directly available to that participant, and the collaboration may beneﬁt from this information
being communicated at an appropriate time.
This paper focuses on determining when information exchange is beneﬁcial in the particular case of a computer collab-
orating with a person when their shared endeavor involves tasks for most of which they may operate semi-independently.
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In semi-independent situations, the individual actions and joint actions that collaborative plans comprise can be reasoned
about separately. The paper proposes an approach that takes advantage of this “nearly decomposable” structure of activi-
ties in semi-independent settings. To overcome the complexity barrier of collaborative decision-making in general settings,
which has been shown to be intractable [9], it deﬁnes nearly decomposable processes and a new formal model of effective
information exchange for nearly decomposable decision-making problems. It uses this model to deﬁne an approximate al-
gorithm for computing information exchange strategies for nearly decomposable problems. Throughout the paper, we use
interruption management, a special case of information exchange, to illustrate the use of the model and operation of the al-
gorithm. The model and algorithm do, however, handle information exchange and nearly decomposable tasks more broadly.
Nearly decomposable task structures, as well as important challenges of interruption management, may be illustrated by
the example of an automated agent for mobile commerce that works with a person to plan shopping stops on the route
home from work. The agent generates suggested route changes to meet the driver’s shopping needs opportunistically, while
keeping in mind the cost of the suggested route changes. The driver and agent share the goal of the person of getting to
his or her destination effectively, but each of them performs an individual task: the person drives the car, and the agent
generates an optimal route. For signiﬁcant portions of the time, each operates alone, but at key points the agent may
interrupt the person to suggest a stop [32]. The agent might also beneﬁt from interrupting the person to get information
about road conditions or shopping preferences. To succeed, the agent needs to decide wisely whether and when to interrupt
the driver for such information. A navigation system that continuously interrupts may distract drivers’ attention from the
road or irritate them to the point where they ignore or turn off the system. Fig. 1 illustrates this situation schematically. To
represent the fact that participants are mostly performing their own tasks, and they interact only when needing to exchange
information, the arcs representing individual actions are thicker than the arcs representing joint actions.
Information exchange actions, and interruptions in particular, usually generate costs, including communication and
cognitive costs. For computer agents to avoid overburdening their human partners, they must manage such interactions
appropriately. This paper combines theoretical model development, machine learning and empirical studies of several fac-
tors that affect people’s perceptions of, and responses to, agents’ information exchange actions. This research followed an
incremental design sequence: (1) constructing an initial, formal model of information exchange, (2) developing an algo-
rithm for computing information exchange strategies eﬃciently based on this model; (3) conducting empirical studies to
determine when people’s willingness to accept information exchange requests differs from the strategies computed by the
algorithm; (4) using machine learning to predict the conditions under which people deviate from the information exchange
decisions made by the algorithm.
We formalize the planning problem for nearly decomposable tasks as a NEarly Decomposable Markov Decision-Making
Process (NED-MDP). A NED-MDP distinguishes between individual actions relating to a participant’s individual task and joint
actions that relate to coordinating and sharing information between participants. It explicitly represents the division of
nearly decomposable tasks into these two types of actions, embedding this nearly decomposable structure in the transition
and reward functions used by agents in the NED-MDP.
This paper deﬁnes NED-MDPs formally and presents a novel algorithm, the NEarly Decomposable algorithm for nearly
DECOmposable Processes (NED-DECOP). The NED-DECOP algorithm exploits the structure of NED-MDPs to approximate the
optimal strategy for sharing information and coordinating in the collaborative activity. It explicitly reasons about the effects
of agents’ coordination strategies on a group’s joint performance in the future. Unlike related algorithms, and importantly,
it is not myopic. Furthermore, as demonstrated in the paper, depending on the way participants’ individual tasks are solved,
the complexity of the algorithm may be no worse than the complexity of the algorithm used to solve participants’ individual
tasks.
We designed an agent that computed the value of interruption opportunities using the nearly decomposable structure of
these problem situations. The agent’s decisions were empirically evaluated using a collaborative game in which a person and
a computer agent have separate tasks, but their success is a joint measure combining their performances. In performing their
separate tasks, the agent and the person can help each other by exchanging information; doing so has a cost. Throughout
the game, the person has information of value to the agent’s task, which the agent may beneﬁt from knowing. To obtain
this information, the agent must interrupt the person. Because the human player has complete information about the game
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to both participants. A wide range of prior research suggests, however, that people might deviate from this “purely rational”
approach [5,14,18]. As a result, an interaction intended to be beneﬁcial for the collaboration may turn into a performance
degrading disturbance.
To understand how people perceive the beneﬁt of an interruption, we collected over 700 game instances that varied
in the extent to which providing information to the agent beneﬁted the collaborative activity, the distribution of beneﬁt
between players, and the moment in the game at which the interruption occurred. We also varied the perceived partner
type: although in all cases, subjects interacted with a computer agent, some subjects were told their partner was another
person. We measured whether people accepted interruption requests in different conditions, examining in particular the
inﬂuence of four factors on people’s decisions to accept or reject these requests: (1) the actual beneﬁt of an interruption
to the collaboration, (2) the actual beneﬁt of an interruption to the person (to the person’s individual task performance),
(3) the actual beneﬁt of an interruption to the agent (to the agent’s task performance), and (4) the perceived type of the
agent (whether computer or person). We measured whether (2), (3) and (4) affected people’s acceptance rates, even though
only the combined beneﬁt (1) really mattered to the players’ score in the game.
The results show, unsurprisingly, that when the beneﬁt provided by responding to the interruption was substantial (ei-
ther clearly positive or negative), people’s behavior aligned with that predicted by the NED-DECOP algorithm. However,
when the beneﬁt was relatively small, the two diverged. Most interestingly, when the beneﬁt was equivocal, people’s de-
cisions to accept depended on whether they perceived the interruption to come from a person or from a computer agent.
They tended to accept interruptions from other people more readily than from computers in these situations. The decision
also depended on people’s perception of the beneﬁt of the interruption to individual participants. For interruptions with
small beneﬁts or losses, people tend to overestimate the individual beneﬁt to themselves, and undervalue the beneﬁt of
interruptions to their partners, even though the game score and overall reward to the person depended only on the sum of
these scores.
We analyzed the disparity between people’s behavior and that predicted by the NED-DECOP algorithm using two dif-
ferent standard machine learning algorithms to identify the inﬂuence of the four factors listed above on people’s behavior.
We compared the performance of both personalized and general learning methods in predicting people’s decisions. The best
results, which were obtained with a model that combined these two approaches, achieved almost 90% accuracy.
The key contributions of this paper are the deﬁnition of nearly-decomposable decision-making problems, the design of
the NED-DECOP algorithm for computing agents’ coordination strategies for such problems, and a new methodology for
designing interruption-management policies in collaborative group activities involving both people and computer agents.
The methodology uses the NED-DECOP algorithm to establish a fully rational baseline of behavior. This baseline is then used
to evaluate empirically how people perceive requests for interruptions in diverse types of situations, determining when
people deviate from the optimal policy. Finally, machine learning is used to build learned models that can predict the
probability that people will accept an interruption, using a combination of domain features and features informed by the
algorithm. This methodology can form the basis for the iterated design of agents that effectively exchange information when
collaborating with people.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section describes prior work on decentralized multi-agent collaboration
strategies and on interruption management. Section 3 describes the game we used to investigate the interruption manage-
ment problem. Section 4 shows how NED-MDPs can be used to approximate the optimal strategies for a computer agent in
this setting, and how these strategies can be used in practice to make a decision whether to interrupt people in the domain.
Section 5 provides a detailed empirical evaluation of this approach in the laboratory using human subjects. Section 6 uses
machine learning techniques to measure the extent to which people’s decision-making differs from the rational models.
Section 7 discusses how to adapt our methodology to other domains and to integrate the learned model into agent de-
sign. Section 8 concludes and describes some important challenges for future work. This paper signiﬁcantly extends earlier
work [33] by formally deﬁning NED-MDPs, providing a general algorithm for solving them, and showing how the model can
be improved using machine learning.
2. Related work
The work reported in this paper relates to two very different areas of prior work and a range of approaches within each:
decision-theoretic multi-agent planning and interruption management. The subsections below discuss related work in these
two areas respectively.
2.1. Decision-theoretic multi-agent planning
Various approaches have modeled collaborative decision-making and planning in environments in which there are uncer-
tainty and costs, including Multi-agent Markov Decision Process (MMDP) [11], Communicative Multi-agent Team Decision
Problem (COM-MTDP) [49], and Decentralized Markov Decision Processes (Dec-MDP and Dec-POMDP) [9]. These models are
shown to be equivalent in terms the problems they represent and the computational complexity for solving them [60].
Since the introduction of Decentralized MDPs as a formal model for decentralized multi-agent planning, a number of
algorithms have been proposed for computing exact or approximate solutions. Noteworthy examples of approaches include
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complexity of solving Dec-MDP models has been proven to be NEXP-hard. In particular Bernstein et al. [9] have shown that
solving decentralized MDPs can be doubly exponential for the two agent case. Finding -approximate policies for Dec-MDPs
is also NEXP-hard [51]. Thus, general techniques for Dec-MDPs are not a feasible approach for the types of problems this
paper addresses. We focus this review on approaches that exploit the structure of Dec-MDPs to facilitate decision-making,
and refer the reader to the papers by Oliehoek [45] and Seuken and Zilberstein [60] for a general account on Decentralized
MDPs.
We ﬁrst discuss algorithms that exploit the structure which is embedded in particular classes of Dec-MDPs. When the
joint state is fully observable (or completely non-observable) by all agents, then solving decentralized planning problems
has been shown to be more tractable than general Dec-MDPs [12,50]. In particular, Transition-independent Decentralized
MDPs model problems in which agents operate completely independently, but are connected through a reward structure
that depends on their joint histories. Becker et al. [6] present an optimal algorithm for solving Transition-independent
Dec-MDPs, and Nair et al. [43] propose a multi-agent planning algorithm for agents embedded in a sensor network that
engenders transition independence. As a result, the computational overhead engendered by communication arises only in a
subset of the state space. Other approaches focus on settings in which the joint state space can be factored and interactions
among agents are local, thereby constrained by regions of the state space [47,40]. In particular, Varakantham et al. [64]
partition the state space in domains where interactions between agents are limited to subclasses of the state space called
“coordination locales”. This approach uses a branch-and-bound approach for agents’ task assignment and a special method
for determining whether an agent should change its individual policy and interact with other agents because they are in
the same locale. They consider interaction only in those places. Our own work also exploits structure but for different kinds
of problems – those in which agents’ tasks (not the state space) are partitioned into individual and joint actions. In contrast
to other approaches, we allow interaction to occur at any point in the state space.
Another approach that exploits the special structure of a subclass of Dec-MDPs for eﬃcient planning is Event-driven
Dec-MDPs (ED-DEC-MDPs). ED-DEC-MDPs factor the state space according to agents’ individual tasks and the transition
model is decoupled based on limited interactions between agents [7]. Mostafa and Lesser [42] generalized ED-DEC-MDPs
to represent complex interactions in agents’ reward functions. They assume that agents fully observe their local states
and constrain interactions between these local states to depend on previous events. Temporally Decoupled Dec-POMDPs
decompose agents’ interactions into individual models that are loosely decoupled [66]. Although they do not factor the
state space like ED-DEC-MDPs, they still require that agents’ interactions depend on past events. In contrast, in a NED-MDP,
agents may not fully observe their local states, and interactions may occur concurrently, as in the empirical setting we will
describe in the following section. More recent work by Melo et al. [41] focuses on optimizing communication decisions
in Dec-MDPs with sparse interactions. It assumes that agents’ observations are independent of other agents’ actions, that
agents can query other agents’ local states about their communication actions, and that communication actions do not affect
the state transitions. None of these assumptions hold in a NED-MDP.
Other approaches to reducing the complexity overhead from information exchange consider models with zero or ﬁxed
communication costs. With zero costs, the complexity of the multi-agent decision-making problem reduces to the com-
plexity of solving the single-agent problem, as agents can synchronize information at each time-step [49]. Roth et al. [56]
propose a multi-agent decision-making model that exploits this fact in team decision-making. In this model, policies for
individual agents are computed off-line, while communication decisions are exogenous to the model and are made during
run-time. Decisions about how and when to communicate are performed greedily [54,55]. Finally, some approaches com-
bine both transition independence and constraints on communication. For instance, Goldman and Zilberstein [21] present
approximate algorithms for transition-independent Dec-MDPs that assume that agents can achieve the perfect view of the
global state when they communicate and communication actions have a ﬁxed cost.
While these approaches have proven effective in settings that meet the constraints for which they were designed, they
do not, either individually or taken together, address the challenges that arise in human–computer information exchange,
because their underlying assumptions do not hold. In particular, for most such mixed computer–human settings communi-
cation is not free, and communication costs necessarily depend on the agents’ joint state space. In addition, the transition
matrix over the state space depends on agents’ joint actions.
Approximate solution algorithms have been proposed as an alternative approach to reducing complexity. A polynomial-
time algorithm presented by Beynier and Mouaddib [10] approximates the joint policy with individual agent policies that are
connected by temporal and resource constraints. This algorithm assumes that individual agent models are fully observable
and thus excludes communication decisions from the model. Xuan et al. [67] propose an approximate algorithm that uses
heuristic functions to compute the expected beneﬁt of communication by comparing information gain with the cost. These
heuristic methods are empirically evaluated; they do not guarantee performance bounds. As a special case of these heuristic
methods, myopic approaches capture the expected beneﬁt of interruption by assuming that communication can only happen
at the present time and ignoring future opportunities [8]. These approaches diverge from the optimal if the setting allows
repeated and frequent communication between agents.
2.2. Interruption management
Our work relates to several threads of prior work on interruption management in the computational and cognitive
sciences. McFarlane [39] compared four strategies for deciding when to interrupt users: immediate, negotiated (user choos-
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within a predetermined schedule). His results show that none of the proposed strategies is the single best approach, echoing
the need for decision-making to choose among different interruption strategies.
Several works have suggested agent-designs for interruption management that are based on reasoning about the beneﬁt
to either the computer system or the user, but not both. One approach is to use a predictive model of people’s reaction
to notiﬁcations from computers to decide whether to postpone communication [25–27,19,28]. This approach ignores the
potential beneﬁt of an interruption to the computer agent’s task completion, which may affect overall collaboration and the
quality of the group endeavor. Approaches that focus solely on the needs of the system, do not reason about the effect of
an interruption on users’ behavior [58]. Finally, Voida and Mynatt [65] propose an agent design for interrupting users that
assumes knowledge of the relevancy of each task the user is performing, but does not consider the cost or beneﬁt of the
interruption itself.
Work in human–computer interaction has shown that people often underestimate their own beneﬁt from an interruption
and perceive the party generating the interruption to gain more than themselves [44,36]. The way a notiﬁcation system is
perceived at the initial stages of interaction is an important determinant for the success of further interactions [37]. The
need to consider both sides of the interaction echoes Rudman and Zajicek [57] who suggest that computer agents should
initiate interactions that are perceived to be useful by their users. Our work is the ﬁrst to provide a principled approach to
interruption management as a collaborative activity that reasons about the effects of interruption to all participants.
Work in psychology has investigated the differences between people’s self report of their willingness to be interrupted
and other people’s prediction about this willingness in face-to-face communication [3]. Other works have investigated the
effects of interruptions on people’s performance of cognitive tasks. These include the relevance of an interruption to the
primary task and the characteristics of the primary task [16], the length and memory requirements of an interruption [20],
the mental load of a user at the time of interruption [29], and the timing and complexity of an interruption [24].
The approach described in this paper also differs from proposals to deploy user-interface design to alleviate the costs
of interruptions. It has been shown that providing people with a history of recent actions helps them to recover from in-
terruptions [52]. McCrickard et al. [38] investigated the effect on task performance of saliency-conveying signals (e.g., color
variation) in notiﬁcations as a way of enabling systems to that trade-off the utility of a notiﬁcation with the cost of inter-
ruption. A similar line of research has been conducted to study multi-modal interfaces as a way of delivering interruptions
of various utilities [2]. Awareness displays are designed to display information about the workload of a partner, and they
have been shown to be useful for better managing interruptions between people [17].
3. Approaches for collaborative decision-making
This section models nearly-decomposable decision-making problems with traditional approaches to collaborative multi-
agent decision-making. We then describe a new approach that makes explicit the interdependencies between the individual
and joint actions of each agent. This approach can lead to exponential savings in computation time as compared to tradi-
tional DEC-MDP solution algorithms.
3.1. The DEC-MDP approach
A Decentralized Markov Decision Process (Dec-MDP) is a formalism for multi-agent planning that captures the uncertain
and partially observable nature of the real-world. A Dec-MDP includes a set of states with associated transition probabilities,
a set of actions and observations for each agent, and a joint reward function [9]. A solution of a Dec-MDP is an optimal joint
policy for all agents that is represented as a mapping from states to actions. In nearly decomposable problems, the joint
state space is factored into the states representing each agent’s task. Agents may have partial observability about their own
tasks and about other agents’ tasks. In the Dec-MDP formalization of these problems, the joint states encapsulates agents’
local observations, and the transition function describes how these observations depend on each other. Formally, we model
a 2-agent nearly decomposable decentralized planing problem as a Decentralized Markov Decision Problem (Dec-MDP) with
a tuple 〈I,S,A1,A2, T , R, H〉 in which
• I is a set of agents.
• S = S1 × S2 is a set of states. Si indicates the set of states of agent i’s task. Si includes each agent’s local observations
about agent i’s task. A Dec-MDP has a ﬁnite horizon H , and each state shi ∈ Si is associated with a time step h H .• A1 and A2 are the actions of agents 1 and 2, respectively.
• T is a transition function. T (sh+1 | sh, (a1,a2)) is the probability of transitioning from state sh = (sh1, sh2) to sh+1 =
(sh+11 , s
h+1
2 ) given action pair (a1,a2).
• R is a global reward function. R(sh) is the joint reward function obtained by the agents at state sh .1
1 It is also possible to make the reward function depend on the joint actions. The two forms of representation are equivalent.
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stitute the state space of the Dec-MDP. For simplicity, we do not represent these observations explicitly and assume
that the observation function is captured by the transition function.2
A policy for Agent 1, π1, is a mapping from the local observations of Agent 1 about the joint state (i.e., observations about
all agents’ tasks) to an action for Agent 1 (and similarly for Agent 2). We denote the action assigned by policy π1 based
on Agent 1’s local observations as π1(sh) as sh includes Agent 1’s local observations about the joint state. A joint policy
π = (π1,π2) is a pair consisting of a local policy for each agent. The expected value V π (sh) for the joint policy is deﬁned
as
V π
(
sh
)= V (π1,π2)(sh)= R(sh)+ ∑
sh+1 ∈S
T
(
sh+1 | sh, (π1(sh),π2(sh))) · V (π1,π2)(sh+1) (1)
An optimal joint policy π∗(sh) = (π∗1 (sh),π∗2 (sh)) maximizes Eq. (1). An optimal policy for a Dec-MDP determines when
it is beneﬁcial for agents to act individually or jointly. It initiates coordination among agents if doing so improves the
collaborative utility. Although Dec-MDPs can capture decentralized decision-making processes, the complexity of ﬁnding
optimal solutions to Dec-MDPs is known to be NEXP-complete [48], so that Dec-MDPs may not be a practical approach to
solve such problems.
3.2. The NED-MDP approach
A collaborative activity typically includes both individual and joint actions. When participants of the collaboration are
not interacting together, each participant only needs to reason about its individual tasks, as their activities are independent
of each other. Participants need to reason about the collaborative activity only to determine when and how to coordinate,
communicate with each other, support each other during potential breakdowns, and similar issues involving all of the
participants. We model such collaborative activities as nearly-decomposable Markov Decision Processes.
A Nearly Decomposable Markov Decision Process (NED-MDP) is a Dec-MDP in which the state space S can be factored
into individual state spaces S1,S2 for agents A1 and A2 respectively that satisfy the following conditions:
1. there exists an individual transition function for Agent 1, T1(s
h+1
1 | sh1, (a1,a2)) that represents the probability of reaching
an individual state sh+11 given sh1 and joint actions (a1,a2) (and similarly for Agent 2),
2. there exists an individual reward function for Agent 1, R1(sh1), mapping state s
h
1 and action a1 to a real number (and
similarly for Agent 2),
3. the joint transition function T can be represented as the product of agents’ individual transition functions,
T
((
sh+11 , s
h+1
2
) ∣∣ (sh1, sh2), (a1,a2))= T1(sh+11 | sh1, (a1,a2)) · T2(sh+12 | sh2, (a1,a2)) (2)
4. the joint reward function R can be represented as the aggregate of the individual reward functions R1 and R2,
R
(
sh1, s
h
2
)= R1(sh1)+ R2(sh2) (3)
5. the action set A1 for Agent 1 can be factored to a set of independent actions AI1 and joint actions A
J
1 (and similarly
for Agent 2). Both agents coordinate to perform joint actions. When the agents are acting dependently (a1 ∈ A J1 and
a2 ∈ A J2 ), the transition function for each agent depends on the joint action pair. When the agents are acting indepen-
dently (a1 ∈ AI1 or a2 ∈ AI2), the transition function for each agent is independent of the other’s action.
T1
(
sh+11 | sh1, (a1,a2)
)= T1(sh+11 | sh1,a1) if a1 ∈ AI1,a2 ∈ AI2 (4)
(and similarly for Agent 2),
6. the set of joint actions for the group, A J , is the Cartesian product of A J1 and A
J
2 , containing all pairs of joint actions
agents can perform in coordination.
For example, in Fig. 1, the person’s individual actions focus on driving and the agent’s individual actions focus on searching
for commerce opportunities. The joint actions include the agent’s suggestion of a commerce opportunity to the person, and
the person’s response to this suggestion.
The joint policy for a NED-MDP is a mapping from the joint state space to a joint action for every time step, just as in
a DEC-MDP. The following theorem states that the value of a joint policy is the sum of the values of individual policies of
Agents 1 and 2.
2 We represent the observation model as a part of the transition function for simplicity of representation. These two approaches are equivalent in
expressiveness.
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respectively. The value of the joint policy π in Eq. (1) is the aggregate of the values of the individual policies for Agents 1 and 2:
V π
(
sh1, s
h
2
)= V π1 (sh1, sh2)+ V π2 (sh1, sh2) (5)
where the value for Agent 1 of choosing the policy π in state sh = (sh1, sh2) is
V π1
(
sh1, s
h
2
)= R1(sh1)+ ∑
(sh+11 ,s
h+1
2 )
T
((
sh+11 , s
h+1
2
) ∣∣ (sh1, sh2),π(sh1, sh2)) · V π1 (sh+11 , sh+12 ) (6)
(and similarly for Agent 2).
The proof is presented in Appendix A.
Corollary 2. An optimal policy for initial states (s01 , s
0
2)maximizes Eq. (5) as given below,
π∗
(
s01, s
0
2
)= argmax
(a1,a2)
(R1
(
s01
)+ R2(s02)
+
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∑
(s11,s
1
2)
T1(s11 | s01, (a1,a2)) · T2(s12 | s02, (a1,a2))
·(V π1 (s11, s12) + V π2 (s11, s12)) if (a1,a2) ∈ A J∑
(s11,s
1
2)
T1(s11 | s01,a1) · T2(s12 | s02,a2)
·(V π1 (s11, s12) + V π2 (s11, s12)) otherwise
(7)
3.3. Modeling interruption management as a Nearly-Decomposable Decision-Making Problem
This section describes an experimental setting for studying an interruption management problem that is modeled as a
NED-MDP. The “interruption game” [31] involves two players, referred to as the “principal” and the “agent”. Each player
needs to complete an individual task but the players’ scores depend on each other’s performance.
The game is played on a board of 6 × 6 squares. Each player is allocated a starting position and a goal position on
the board. The game comprises a ﬁxed, known number of rounds. Players advance on the board by moving to an adjacent
square. The players’ goals move stochastically on the board according to a Gaussian probability distribution centered at
the current position of the goal.3 Players earn 10 points in the game each time they move to the square on which their
assigned goal is located. After a goal is reached, the goals are reassigned to random positions on the board. Players can see
their positions and the goal location of the other player, but they differ in their ability to see their own goal location: The
principal can see the location of its goal throughout the game, while the agent can see the location of its goal at the onset
of the game, but not during consecutive rounds.
At each round, both players can move their icon one position on the board. In addition, the agent can choose to interrupt
the principal and request the current location of its goal. The principal is free to accept or reject an interruption request. If
the principal rejects the interruption request, the players continue moving. If the interruption is accepted by the principal
player, the location of the agent’s goal in the current round (but not in consecutive rounds) is automatically revealed to the
agent. There is a joint cost for revealing this information to the agent, in that neither participant will be able to move for
one round. When making a decision whether to accept an interruption request, the principal can also observe the belief of
the agent about the location of its goal.
Each player needs to complete an individual task, but players’ scores depend on the other’s performance as well as their
own. The players share a joint scoring function that is the cumulative score of both players. An interruption is potentially
beneﬁcial for the individual performance of the agent, who can use this information to direct its movement, but it may
affect the principal’s performance negatively. When the agent deliberates about whether to ask for information, or when
the principal deliberates about whether to accept an interruption to reveal the agent’s goal, the players need to weigh the
trade-offs associated with the potential beneﬁt to the agent player with the potential detriment to their joint performance
in the game. The success of both players in the game depends on the agent’s ability to estimate the collaborative value of
interrupting at any point in the game and use that information to choose wisely when to interrupt the principal.
Fig. 2 shows the game GUI from the perspective of each participant and illustrates the nearly-decomposable structure
of this group activity. The right-hand side of the ﬁgure shows the individual task of the principal, getting the me icon to
the goal Gme . It also shows the location of the agent (the smiley icon) and the agent’s goal Gsmiley . The degree to which a
square is shaded represents the agent’s uncertainty about its goal location, giving the person information about the agent’s
belief state. Dark shaded squares imply higher certainty about the goal’s location. The left-hand side of the ﬁgure shows the
individual task of the agent, showing only the location of the agent and the goal of the principal.
3 The movement of the goal is restricted in that it does not move closer to the position of the player.
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The interruption game is analogous to the types of interactions that occur in collaborative settings involving a mixed
network of computer agents and people. For example, the principal player in the interruption game may correspond to the
user of a collaborative system for writing an academic paper, and the agent to a the collaborative assistant responsible for
obtaining bibliographical data [4].4 While participants share a common goal of completing a document, each of them works
independently to complete its individual task, such as composing paragraphs or searching for bibliographical information.
This aspect is represented in the interruption game by assigning an individual goal for each player. The movement of these
goals on the board corresponds to the dynamic nature of these tasks. For example, the user may not know what to write
next, and the system may have uncertainty about search results. The agent’s lack of information about its own goal location
in the game corresponds to the uncertainty of a system about the preferences and intentions of its user, such as which bibli-
ographical information to include in the paper. The ability to query the user for keywords and to choose among different bib-
liographies provides the system with valuable guidance and direction. It may, however, impede the performance of both par-
ticipants on their individual tasks, because the system needs to suspend its search for bibliographical data when it queries
the user, and the user may be distracted by the query. This dynamic cost of interruption represents the costs incurred by
both people and computer agents due to task switching and task recovery for initiating and responding to an interruption.
We used the interruption game, rather than a real-world domain or application, because it is the simplest setting in
which to study the factors that inﬂuence interruption management in collaborative settings. The rules of the game are easy
for people to learn, and provide incentives for players to reach their goals as quickly as possible. Despite its simplicity,
computing the value of an interruption request in the game is challenging. The agent’s uncertainty about the location
of its own goal increases over time, and its performance depends on successfully querying the principal and obtaining
the correct position of its goal. A straightforward computation of the value of an interruption request requires the agent
to consider all possible combinations of the future actions and the possible transition states of both agent and person.
Because a player’s future state is determined by the joint action taken by players, the game is not transition independent.
Both actions need to be optimized together, signiﬁcantly increasing the computational complexity. Kamar and Grosz [31]
have shown that the interruption game can be modeled as a Dec-MDP, and the complexity of ﬁnding optimal solutions
to Dec-MDPs is known to be NEXP-complete [48]. Furthermore, existing models with lower complexity (such as the ones
described in Section 2) cannot be used to model the interruption game because the value of an interruption needs to
consider all possible combinations of agents’ future actions and the assumptions made by these models are not satisﬁed in
the interruption game.
We now show that the interruption game can be deﬁned as a Nearly Decomposable Decision-Making problem. An NED-
MDP can formalize an interruption game in which the agent and the person players have different observations about the
world. For ease of presentation, we formalize a version of the interruption game in which neither player can observe the
goal position of the agent but the position is revealed when an interruption is established. In Section 4, we will show that
the nearly decomposable representation of the interruption game can signiﬁcantly reduce the computation that is required
to compute the value of an interruption request in the game.
• The left-hand side of the ﬁgure shows the information that is available to the agent when reasoning about its individual
task, showing the location of the agent and the goal and location of the principal, but lacking the goal of the agent.
4 Interruptions are excluded from the original system described in Babaian et al. [4] to prevent initiating interruptions at inappropriate times, since the
system lacked a well-founded or formal approach for managing interruptions.
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its goal at round h, respectively, and B denotes the set of board positions.
• SA is the set of states for the agent and includes 〈phA,bh〉, where phA ∈ B is the position of the agent and bh is the
agent’s belief over its goal positions at round h. The term P (gh+1A | ph+1A , ghA) represents the probability of the goal
position moving from ghA to g
h+1
A when the player is in position p
h+1
A . This distribution is updated at each time step to
reﬂect the agent’s changing belief about the position of its goal, as shown below:
∀gh+1A ∈ B, bh+1
(
gh+1A
)= ∑
ghA∈B
bh
(
ghA
) · P(gh+1A ∣∣ ph+1A , ghA) (8)
Intuitively, as the game progresses, the uncertainty of the agent about its goal location will increase if it does not
receive information about its goal from the principal. Although the belief state is continuous, we only need to consider
a ﬁnite number of states, those that are reachable with non-zero probability.
• The set of actions AP for the principal include its movement actions on the board and whether to accept an interruption
request from the agent. The set of actions AA for the agent include its movement actions on the board and whether
to initiate an interruption request. The set of independent actions AIP for the principal agent is a subset of AP , and
contains its possible movement actions on the board. The set of independent actions AIA for the agent is similar. A
J
includes a single joint action pair, 〈interrupt, accept〉. Because all participants have the same observations about the
state of the world, they will not miscoordinate given that both are solving the same NED-MDP. Therefore the action pair
〈interrupt, reject〉 is excluded from this representation. (When players have different observations, the 〈interrupt, reject〉
action pair must be included.) In practice, participants may not use the same model to reason about the game (such
as when playing with people). In this case miscoordinations are possible, because the principal may reject the agent’s
interruptions even though they have the same observations. (We studied this behavior empirically in Section 6.)5
• The transition function for the principal is denoted as T P (sh+1P | shP , (aP ,aA)) where shP , sh+1P ∈ SP represent states at
rounds h and h+ 1 for the principal; aP represent an action for the principal; aA denotes an action for the agent. If the
joint action constituents (aP ,aA) are individual actions (i.e., movement on the board), then we have aP ∈ AIP ,aA ∈ AIA
and by Eq. (4) the transition function for each participant depends solely on its own actions. In this case, the transition
function for the principal advances location and goal from its position in turn h to its position in turn h + 1, as deﬁned
by the probability distribution over locations on the board.
T P
(
sh+1P
∣∣ shP , (aP ,aA))= P(gh+1P ∣∣ ph+1P , ghP ) (9)
where ph+1P = phP + aP . The transition function for the agent assigns probability 1 to state sh+1A , which includes its
position on the board ph+1A (the location of the agent after it performs a movement action ahA ), and bh+1, the distribution
over the agent’s goal updated using its prior belief state and the updated position of the agent. T A is deﬁned as given
below:
T A
(
sh+1A
∣∣ shA, (aP ,aA))=
{
1 if ph+1A = phA + aA, sh+1A = 〈ph+1A ,bh+1〉
0 otherwise
(10)
where bh+1 is updated from bh with respect to ph+1A using Eq. (8).
If (aP ,aA) represent joint actions of the principal and agent, we have (aP ∈ A JP ,aA ∈ A JA). If (aP ,aA) represents an
interruption request by the agent that is accepted by the principal, then the principal does not move at turn h since it
accepted an interruption request (i.e., ph+1P = phP ). In this case the transition function for the principal is as follows:
T P
(
sh+1P
∣∣ shP , (aP ,aA))= P(gh+1P ∣∣ ph+1P , ghP ) (11)
where ph+1P = phP .
T A
(
sh+1A
∣∣ shA, (aP ,aA))=
{
1 if ph+1A = phA,bh(ghA) = 1, sh+1A = 〈ph+1A ,bh+1〉
0 otherwise
(12)
That is, the agent does not move at round h and has knowledge about its true goal location, and bh+1 is updated using
Eq. (8).
• The reward function is deﬁned as R(sh) = RP (shP ) + RA(shA) where the reward function for the principal, RP , equals 1
when the principal reaches its goal, as shown below,
5 Note that since there is no cost in this game for interrupting but only for accepted interruptions, if there were such an action, the agent might interrupt
indeﬁnitely until the person accepts.
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(
shP
)= { 1 if phP = ghP
0 otherwise
(13)
In contrast to the principal, the agent has partial information about the state of the world, and cannot observe its goal.
Therefore it uses its belief state about the location of the goal as an approximation to the reward. The reward function
RA(shA) for the agent is thus deﬁned as the likelihood of the agent’s goal being at the same position as the agent
according to its belief state.
RA
(
shA
)= bh(phA) (14)
An optimal joint policy for a NED-MDP π∗ = (π∗P ,π∗A) is a tuple composed of local policies for each agent. For the
principal this policy is a mapping from SP × SA to AP , and the policy of the agent is a mapping from SP × SA to AA . Thus,
the joint policy for the principal and the agent will specify (1) the movement actions on the board, and (2) the times in
which it is optimal for the agent to interrupt the principal.
4. Computing coordination strategies using NED-MDPs
In this section we present an algorithm that uses the NED-MDP model to eﬃciently compute information exchange
strategies for agents. The algorithm NED-DECOP decouples a NED-MDP into individual models that are linked to coordinate
agents’ joint actions. It exploits the special structure of nearly decomposable planning problems to overcome the intractabil-
ity of existing approaches for solving these problems. Given the nearly decomposable structure a NED-MDP, and that agents
act individually more often than they act jointly, agents only consider their local state when optimizing their individual
actions. The algorithm makes the simplifying assumption that agents do not reason about the possible discrepancies in each
other’s models that may result from differences in their observations. In the interruption game, this means that the agent
will not consider the possible discrepancy in the observations of the person and the agent. This signiﬁcantly facilitates the
computation of the agents’ policies, because it will not have to consider the possible discrepancy in the observations of the
person and the agent. Throughout this section, the states for both participants (S1 and S2) are composed of the agent’s
observations about these tasks (the participant that is assumed to be using the algorithm to make its decisions).
There are two building blocks to the NED-DECOP algorithm, a query model and a coordination model. The query model is
used to compute the optimal policy for a single agent given a set of strategies that ﬁx when the agent acts individually and
when it acts jointly with another agent. The coordination model uses the query model to compute the joint value (values
combined for both agents) for a given sequence of individual and joint actions.
We begin with deﬁnitions of several terms used in specifying the models. Given an agent m, AIm is the set of individual
actions for m. A is the expanded set of actions that includes agents’ individual action sets and the set of joint action pairs.
Given two agents this set is deﬁned below,
A = AI1 ∪ AI2 ∪ A J (15)
The function ft(ai) denotes the action type of ai ∈ A. The type of ai equals constant I if ai ∈ AIm for agent m (i.e., ai is an
individual action of agent m). The nearly-decomposable structure of NED-MDPs means that we don’t need to distinguish
among individual actions to optimize coordination decisions, given that individual actions can be optimized independently
for each agent. The type of ai equals J i if ai ∈ A J (i.e., ai is a particular joint action J i).
ft(a) =
{
I if ai ∈ AIl
J i if ai ∈ A J (16)
In the interruption game modeled in the previous section, the set AIl includes players’ movement actions, while the set A
J
includes only the single joint action J1 which is 〈interrupt, accept〉.
The NED-DECOP algorithm abstracts away from agents’ speciﬁc actions and reasons about action types, rather than ac-
tions. We therefore use the notion of a coordination type sequence to represent a set of action types. Formally, a coordination
type sequence Ch,H−1 = {th, th+1, . . . , tH−1} is an ordered set of action types for rounds h through H − 1, where H is the
horizon. The agents take actions in rounds 0 through H − 1. The type tk ∈ {I, J1, . . . , J |A J |} denotes the type of action at
round k. Superscripts are used to refer to the round number in which an action is taken. We abbreviate and use the term
“coordination sequence” for the rest of the paper. We say the actual action sequence {ahl , . . . ,aH−1l } agrees with type se-
quence Ch,H−1 if ft(akl ) is equal to t
k for all rounds h  k  H − 1. In other words, the action types in the coordination
sequence at each round h, . . . , H − 1 match the types in the action sequence. For example, the individual action “move left”
at round 2, the joint action 〈interrupt, accept〉 at round 3, and the individual action “move right” at round 4 agree with the
type sequence C2,4 = {I, J1, I}.
The query model computes the value for one agent, whom we denote “Agent1” of doing a set of actions that agree with
a particular type sequence. To this end, the type sequences are embedded in the state space of the query model, as speciﬁed
in Deﬁnition 3. In actual model construction, as we explain later in this section, the choice of which agent to assign as the
query model agent affects the complexity of the algorithm.
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• Sq is a ﬁnite set of states that are derived from the states representing Agent1’s task S1 by appending to each sh1 ∈ S1
a type sequence from round h to H − 1. For all possible type sequences Ch,H−1 ∈ {I, J1, . . . , J |A J |}H−h and all states for
Agent1’s task sh1 ∈ S1 there exists a state shq ∈ Sq such that shq = sh1 ∪ Ch,H−1.• The set of actions Aq is the combination of the individual actions for Agent1 and the set of joint actions, i.e., Aq is
deﬁned as Aq = AI1 ∪ A J .• The transition function also simply extends coordination-sequence information as follows
Tq
(
sh+1q
∣∣ shq,aq)= T1(sh+11 ∣∣ sh1,aq) (17)
where aq ∈ Aq and sh+1q = sh+11 ∪ Ch+1,H−1 and Ch+1,H−1 = Ch,H−1\{th}.
• The reward function Rq(shq) = R1(sh1), where shq = sh1 ∪ Ch,H−1.
The optimal policy for the query model, denoted π∗q , speciﬁes the best action for this agent to take in round h under
the constraint that its future actions in rounds h + 1, . . . , H − 1 agree with the type sequence Ch,H−1. The term V π∗q (shq)
represents the individual value for Agent1 when using the optimal policy, i.e.,
V π
∗
q
(
shq
)= max
aq : ft (aq)=th
[
Rq
(
shq
)+ Σsh+1q Tq(sh+1q ∣∣ shq,aq) · V π∗q (sh+1q )] (18)
The policy π∗q that maximizes the value function of a given query model is
π∗q
(
shq
)= argmax
aq : ft (aq)=th
Σsh+1q Tq
(
sh+1q
∣∣ shq,aq) · V π∗q (sh+1q ) (19)
Deﬁnition 4. The coordination model for Agent2 is the MDP 〈Sc,Ac, Tc, Rc〉 which is speciﬁed as follows:
• Sc is a ﬁnite set of states derived from S2 by appending to each state sh2 ∈ S2 a type sequence from round 0 to h − 1
and the initial state s01 of Agent1’s task. For all states s
h
2 ∈ S2 and s01 ∈ S1, and C0,h−1 ∈ {I, J1, . . . , J |A J |}h there exists a
coordination state shc ∈ Sc , shc = sh2 ∪C0,h−1 ∪ so1. The sequence C0,h−1 represents the types of actions that led to the state
shc from the initial state s
0
c .• The set of actions Ac is the combination of the individual actions for Agent2 and the set of joint actions, Ac = AI2 ∪ A J .
• The transition function is deﬁned as Tc(sh+1c | shc ,ac) = T2(sh+12 | sh2,ac), where ac ∈ Ac , sh+1c = sh+12 ∪ C0,h ∪ s01 and
C0,h = C0,h−1 ∪ { ft(ac)}.
• The reward function is Rc(shc ) = R2(sh2), where shc = sh2 ∪ C0,h−1 ∪ s01.
The value function for the coordination model is denoted V π
∗
c . For any given coordination sequence C0,H−1, the value
function queries the query model to obtain the value for Agent1 that is associated with the best actions which agree with
the action sequence C0,H−1. Thus, V π∗c represents the joint values of Agent1 and Agent2 for any coordination sequence.
V π
∗
c
(
shc
)=
{
maxa∈Ac (Rc(shc ) + Σsh+1c Tc(sh+1c | shc ,a) · V π
∗
c (sh+1c )) if h < H
Rc(shc ) + V π
∗
q (so1 ∪ C0,H−1) if shc = sH2 ∪ C0,H−1 ∪ s01
(20)
The action that maximizes this value determines whether agents are better off acting jointly rather than acting individ-
ually. This is key for computing the value of an interruption request in the interruption game.
For any given state of the coordination model, the policy π∗c selects the action of the coordination model that maxi-
mizes V π
∗
c . This action identiﬁes the coordination strategy for both agents, and optimizes Agent2’s action accordingly.
π∗c
(
shc
)= argmax
a∈Ac
(
Σsh+1c Tc
(
sh+1c
∣∣ shc ,a) · V π∗c (sh+1c )) (21)
4.1. The NED-DECOP algorithm
The input to the NED-DECOP algorithm is a NED-MDP, the initial states for the query and coordination model, and an
assignment of agents to the query and coordination model (indicating which is Agent1 and which is Agent2 in Deﬁnitions 3
and 4). The output of the algorithm is the action type the agents should follow in the current round. This decision deter-
mines whether agents should act individually or jointly, and which joint action they should take if they are acting jointly.
We describe later how we deal with deciding about individual actions.
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The NED-DECOP algorithm decouples the collaborative decision-making problem in the NED-MDP into individual prob-
lems that are represented in the query and coordination models. Each model contains the state space, reward and transition
function for one of the agents, that agent’s individual actions, as well as the joint action pairs for both agents. The algorithm
comprises the following steps:
1. Generate a query model for the agent in the role of Agent1 according to Deﬁnition 3.
2. Generate a coordination model for the agent in the role of Agent2 according to Deﬁnition 4.
3. For the given initial state s01 of Agent1 and for all possible type sequences C
0,H−1, assign s0q = s01 ∪C0,H−1. Use the query
model to recursively compute, for all reachable states from rounds 0 to H , the policy for Agent1, π∗q , that agrees with
C0,H−1 according to Eq. (19), and the value of that policy V π
∗
q , according to Eq. (18).
4. For the given initial state s02 of Agent2 and the empty type sequence { }, assign s0c = s02 ∪ { } ∪ s01. Recursively call the
value function V π
∗
c (s0c ) of the coordination model (Eq. (20)) for all reachable states until reaching the horizon H . When
the horizon H is reached, Eq. (20) calls the query model to retrieve the policy for Agent1 given the type sequence that
is embedded in the coordinate model state sHc and the value that is associated with the policy.
5. Output the action π∗c (s0c ), which maximizes the joint value function in Eq. (20) for the initial state s0c .
6. Update initial states s0c and s
0
q for the query and coordination models, given agents’ observations at the current round.
Repeat the computation starting at step 3 for the next round.
As we have stated in the beginning of this section, the NED-DECOP algorithm does not reason about possible differences in
agents’ models. Thus, the NED-DECOP algorithm does not allow for agents to pick an action pair that indicates one agent
is to act jointly and the other individually. Such an action pair is suboptimal, because it would result in mis-coordination.
For instance, consider two robots that may either choose the joint action pair of meeting at the local farmers market to
shop for groceries together (because the produce is too heavy for one to carry alone), or take individual actions of buying
groceries at the supermarket closest to their individual places of work and who share such relevant information as each
other’s schedule in a collaborative setting. The action pair consisting of one agent going to the farmer’s market and the
other agent going to the supermarket is suboptimal, and thus it would never be chosen by these agents.
We illustrate this algorithm in Fig. 3, which shows part of the coordination model, which has two individual actions
(part a) and the query model, which has three individual actions (part b). Nodes in the tree in Fig. 3(a) are labeled with
the states of the coordination model. Similarly, nodes in the tree in Fig. 3(b) are labeled with the states of the query model.
For simplicity, we do not represent all state transitions. The root node of the tree in Fig. 3(a), labeled s02, represents the
initial state of the coordination model, which includes an empty type sequence. Its left-most child node s02 ∪ {I} contains
the type sequence in which Agent2 chooses an individual action I at the ﬁrst round. The leaf of this tree at the bottom
right includes a type sequence {I, J1, I, J1}, which spans the horizon H . When it reaches this leaf node, the algorithm calls
the query model to compute the best policy for Agent1 given that its actions agree with the type sequence embedded in
the state that labels this leaf node, as shown in Fig. 3(b). The joint value to Agent1 and Agent2 for this type sequence is
then propagated up the tree of the coordination model. The actions shown in bold from the root of the tree to the leaves
represent the actions chosen by the algorithm to maximize the joint value function.
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In addition to optimizing the coordination strategy for both agents, the algorithm also optimizes the action of Agent2.
Thus if Agent2 is the agent using the algorithm, the output of the algorithm will specify the actions that Agent2 should take.
If Agent1 is using the algorithm, then an additional optimization step is needed to compute its individual actions. However,
the algorithm has already determined whether agents are acting individually or when and how they are acting jointly for
each state. Thus Agent1 need only focus on optimizing its individual task, which signiﬁcantly reduces the complexity of
computing its policy.
The NED-DECOP algorithm has three advantages over alternative approaches. First, it reasons about the effect of an
information exchange action on future opportunities for coordination, i.e., it is not simply myopic. For example, in the
interruption game, using this algorithm will allow the agent to decide not to interrupt the principal at a given round
because it expects that generating an interruption in a future round will be more beneﬁcial to the group. Second, the
algorithm outputs a coordination strategy that maximizes the value of information exchange actions to the group, rather
than considering only a single agent and the beneﬁt to that agent. Third, it does so eﬃciently by decomposing the group
decision-making problem into the query and coordination models.
The complexity of the NED-DECOP algorithm is (k+1)H ×Ω +Θ , where Ω is the complexity of solving the query model,
Θ is the complexity of solving the coordination model, k = |A J | is the number of joint actions and H is the horizon. The
term (k + 1)H × Ω results from the exponential number of queries made to the query model each time the coordination
model is solved. Since the query model is computed exponentially many times, the complexity of the query model Ω is
the largest factor contributing to the complexity of the NED-DECOP algorithm. Thus, it is important that the query model
be used to represent the simpler of the two agents’ individual problems. If one (or both) of the individual problems is a
fully observable MDP, the query model can be solved in polynomial time. In this case the complexity of the NED-DECOP
algorithm is exponential in the horizon, and the algorithm is able to achieve exponential savings over the general DEC-MDP
approach, which is doubly exponential in the horizon.
Fig. 4 compares the expected running time of the NED-DECOP algorithm with an exact solution algorithm for computing
the best action to take at a randomly selected initial state of the interruption game for varying board sizes and horizons.
The exact solution algorithm used in this comparison, called Forward-Sweep Policy Computation (FSPC), performs dynamic
programming to generate a policy iteratively from end states to the initial state to optimize the best action to take at a
given state [45]. Since this algorithm needs to evaluate joint policy pairs, the complexity of the FSPC algorithm is doubly
exponential in the horizon. As shown by the ﬁgure, the running time of the NED-DECOP algorithm is exponentially less than
the complexity of the exact solution algorithm for the different game instances we sampled.
Lastly, we describe how the NED-DECOP algorithm implements two tenets of foundational collaborative decision-making
models [13,22]. First, an agent needs to reason about the effect of joint actions on the performance of its partner’s task.
This is realized by optimizing a coordination type sequence for the collaboration rather than optimizing individual actions.
Second, these foundational decision-making models do not require an agent to know the details of the model of its partner.
This is realized in that the algorithm does not reason about the possible discrepancies in agents’ observations about the state
of the world. Doing so enables decoupling the decision-making problems and making the algorithm eﬃcient. In practice,
this assumption may not always hold. For example, in the interruption game, the person may observe the location of a goal
that the agent cannot observe. Reasoning about the differences in participants’ observations would exponentially increase
the complexity of the algorithm. However, if the assumption made by the algorithm about agents’ models being identical
holds in a given setting, the decisions of the algorithm about when and how to coordinate are optimal.
4.2. Possible extensions to the NED-DECOP algorithm
This section describes three extensions to the NED-DECOP algorithm to allow for more nuanced models of information
exchange. The ﬁrst addresses a different way to reason about the information that is available to agents when they make
decisions; the second shows how to extract strategies for all group participants; the third deals with adding agents to the
group. Each of these extensions are straightforward.
First, participants in a collaborative activity typically have different information about the world. For example, in the
interruption game, the principal player is able to observe the agent’s goal but the agent is not able to observe its own
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goal. As a result, the principal may assign a different value to an interruption request than the agent and an interruption
generated by the agent player may not be seen as having positive beneﬁt by the person. An interruption requested by the
agent may be rejected. To address this discrepancy, the NED-MDP model given in Section 3.3 can be updated to include joint
action pair 〈interrupt, reject〉 to reason about the fact that the agent’s goal position is observable to the principal player.
Consequently, an additional transition can be incorporated into the coordination model that maps the agent’s belief about
the world to a set of fully observable states, representing the principal’s perspective, and information sets can be added
to represent the set of states that are indistinguishable to the agent. In brief, the NED-DECOP algorithm can be extended
to use this modiﬁed coordination model to compute an expected value for each of the agent’s action by probabilistically
transitioning to each of the fully observable states. This extension is one of the ways an agent may reason about information
discrepancy in a collaborative activity. Reasoning about this discrepancy formally in a multi-agent decision-making problem
may signiﬁcantly increase the complexity of ﬁnding a solution, and the complexity of the NED-DECOP algorithm may be
affected by such extensions. However, compared to general solution algorithms, the NED-DECOP algorithm would still be
more eﬃcient in generating coordination strategies for nearly-decomposable problems, because it decouples coordination
from acting individually.
Second, if strategies for both agents were desired as the outcome of the NED-DECOP algorithm, the action space for the
coordination model would explicitly include all joint action pairs (rather than just their types), and the type function would
distinguish between possible individual actions as well as pairs of joint actions. Although this increases the complexity of
the algorithm, the increase is not exponential in the size of the state space. It only increases the branching factor of the
search tree to the number of all possible action pairs.
The third extension is illustrated in Fig. 5. This ﬁgure shows how to generalize the algorithm and incorporate multiple
query models to make coordination decisions in settings in which one agent can coordinate with multiple others. These
one-to-many interactions may occur in settings where a single user is interacting with multiple computer processes, or a
computer process may request information from multiple users. In this case, the coordination model represents an agent
that is providing resources to several partners on request. An individual query model is generated for each partner agent.
Given that agent i is the resource agent, and agent j is one of its partners, the set of joint actions is A Jq j = A Ji × A Jj . The
set of joint actions for the coordination model is A Jc =
⋃
j =i A
J
i × A Jj . Thus, the branching factor of the coordination model
grows linearly with respect to the number of agents the coordination agent can interact with.
As in the case of the 2-agent algorithm, the complexity of the one-to-many extension of NED-MDP is bounded by the
complexity of solving the most “expensive” query model. It does not grow exponentially with the number of agents in
the model. Thus it is signiﬁcantly more eﬃcient than traditional collaborative planning approaches for which complexity
is exponential in the number of agents. However, these properties of NED-MDP models do not generalize to model many–
many interactions among agents (i.e., multiple resources are connected to multiple partners) when both agents need to
track each other’s models.
542 E. Kamar et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 195 (2013) 528–5504.3. Estimating the value of interruption in the interruption game
Section 3.3 showed how to use NED-MDPs to model the interruption game and Section 4.1 showed how to generate
information exchange strategies in the game using the NED-DECOP algorithm. In this section we show how to estimate the
value to agents that is associated with generating interruption requests in the game. Recall that (shP , s
h
A) are the states of
the principal’s and agent’s tasks based on the agent’s observations about the game. The agent’s estimate of the expected
utility to the group with generating an interruption request, denoted EUIA(s
h
P , s
h
A), is deﬁned as follows:
EUIA
(
shp, s
h
A
)=∑
ghA
bh
(
ghA
) · V π∗c (sh+1c ) (22)
where sh+1c = 〈sh+1A ∪ 〈interrupt, accept〉 ∪ shp〉, and sh+1A = 〈phA,bh+1〉. The term V π
∗
c (sh+1c ) is computed in the NED-DECOP
algorithm of Section 4.1 in Step (4). The term bh+1 refers to the belief state of the agent in round h+1, in which probability
1.0 is given to its true goal location ghA and updated using Eq. (8) to reﬂect the stochastic movement of the goal in turn h.
If the agent decides not to generate an interruption request, it chooses the individual action that maximizes the joint
value function. In this case, the agent’s estimate of the value to the group that is associated for acting individually is denoted
EUNIA (s
h
P , s
h
A) and is deﬁned as follows:
EUNIA
(
shP , s
h
A
)= max
ahA∈AIA
V π
∗
c
(
sh+1c
)
(23)
where sh+1c = 〈sh+1A ∪ {Individual Action} ∪ shP 〉, and sh+1A = 〈ph+1A ,bh+1〉. The term ph+1A = 〈phA + ahA〉 refers to the position of
the agent after taking the individual action ahA , and b
h+1 refers to the updated belief state of the agent at round h + 1.
The agent’s estimate of the expected value of an interruption request to the group, denoted EBI(shP , s
h
A), is the difference
between EUIA and EU
NI
A .
EBI
(
shP , s
h
A
)= EUIA(shP , shA)− EUNIA (shP , shA) (24)
Any interruption request that is generated by the algorithm has a positive EBI(shP , s
h
A) value as computed above.
In contrast to the agent, the principal has full information about the game, including the positions and goals of all
participants. Therefore the principal can better estimate the value of an interruption at a given state of the game without
having uncertainty about the information the agent is missing. The Actual Beneﬁt of an Interruption (ABI) term is equal to
the actual value to the group that is associated with an interruption request given that there is no uncertainty about the
information that is provided following the interruption (i.e., the true location of the agent’s goal on the board), under
the assumption that both players follow the policy computed by the agent in following rounds of the game. This term is
the difference between the principal’s estimate of the joint value when an interruption is established (EUIP (s
h
P , s
h
A)), and
respectively, when an interruption is not established (EUNIP (s
h
P , s
h
A)), given the joint state (s
h
P , s
h
A).
ABI
(
shP , s
h
A
)= EUIP (shP , shA)− EUNIP (shP , shA) (25)
Under the assumption that players will not miscoordinate in future rounds of the game, it is beneﬁcial for the person to
accept an interruption request, if the interruption is associated with a positive ABI value.
The following equations show how to compute the EUIP and EU
NI
P values when using the NED-MDP that is described in
Section 3.3. The term EUIP (s
h
P , s
h
A) is the principal’s estimation of the value that is associated with successfully interrupting
the principal player at round h and updating the agent’s belief state about the true location of its goal at round h.
EUIP
(
shp, s
h
A
)= V π∗c (sh+1c ) (26)
where sh+1c = 〈sh+1A ∪ 〈interrupt, accept〉 ∪ shp〉, and sh+1A = 〈phA,bh+1〉. The term bh+1 refers to the belief state of the agent in
round h + 1, in which probability 1.0 is given to its true goal location ghA and updated using Eq. (8) to reﬂect the stochastic
movement of the goal in turn h.
The term EUNIP (s
h
P , s
h
A) is the principal’s estimation of the value to the group that is associated for not having an inter-
ruption at the current round, i.e.,
EUNIP
(
shP , s
h
A
)= max
ahA∈AIA
V π
∗
c
(
sh+1c
)
(27)
where sh+1c = 〈sh+1A ∪ {Individual Action} ∪ shP 〉. Here, sh+1A = 〈ph+1A ,bh+1〉, ph+1A = 〈phA + ahA〉 refers to the position of the
agent after taking the individual action ahA , and b
h+1 refers to the updated belief state of the agent at round h + 1.
Because the agent cannot observe its goal without interrupting the principal, not every interruption initiated by the
agent is truly beneﬁcial to the players. For example, it may be the case that an interruption request is generated by the
agent, because a joint state is associated with a positive EBI value, while the actual beneﬁt of this interruption, i.e., the
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accept interruptions with positive ABI values as computed above and to reject interruptions with negative ABI values. The
following section presents an empirical setting in which this condition holds (i.e., no future miscoordinations possible) in
the calculation of ABI values. It studies the extent to which people deviate from these predictions when playing the role of
principal players, and it identiﬁes the factors that affect their actual behavior.
5. Empirical methodology
This section describes an experiment in which an agent played the interruption game with people. Our purpose was to
measure the extent to which different factors in the game – such as the collaborative beneﬁt of interruption (ABI), the timing
of interruptions and the perceived partner type – inﬂuence people’s perception of the value of interruptions. The version of
the game we used in our experiments had 10 rounds in total (i.e., the game ended after the principal and the agent acted
10 times including movements on the game board and interruptions), where, for instance, the players reach round 5 after
acting 4 times in the game. A total of 26 subjects participated in the study. The subjects were between ages of 19 and 46
and were given a 20 minute tutorial of the game. Subjects played between 25 and 35 games each, and were compensated
in a manner that was proportional to their total performance. People assumed the principal role. Each game proceeded as
described in Section 3.3. The agent could not observe its own goal location, but could initiate one interruption to acquire
the correct location of its goal from the principal. To minimize the effect of people’s past interactions on their actions (e.g.,
regret from rejecting or accepting an interruption), the interruption game was constrained to allow one interruption request
per game.6 Because no further interruptions are allowed, miscoordination of agents’ actions in future rounds of the game
will not occur. Thus, it is beneﬁcial to the collaborative activity to accept any interruption request with a positive ABI value
as computed in Section 4.3.
Interruptions were generated by the computer agent at different points in the game with varying actual beneﬁt, round
number and the subjects were given different perceived partner types. We measured people’s responses to these requests
given the game conditions at the time of interruptions, which included the number of turns left to play, the positions of
both players on the board, and the agent’s belief about the location of its goal. To investigate the way subject responses
change with respect to the (perceived) beneﬁt of interruptions, the game scenarios were varied to have different ABI values.
To investigate the effect of the timing of an interruption on the subjects’ likelihood of acceptance, we varied the round of
the game at which an interruption was initiated. We hypothesized that people’s responses to interruptions agrees more with
the fully-rational baseline at later rounds of the game as the complexity of decision-making decreases. We also expected
that the type of the agent player (whether a computer or human) would affect the way people respond to interruption
requests. For this reason, in some of the games, subjects were told they would be interacting with other people. However,
subjects were always paired with an agent.7
Subjects were given randomly generated game scenarios that varied the actual beneﬁt of interruption (ABI) over four
types of values: −1.5 (small loss), 1.0 (small gain), 3.5 (medium gain), 6.0 (large gain). The rounds in the game in which
interruptions occurred varied from the beginning of a game (round 3), to the middle of a game (round 5), to the end of
a game (round 7). There were 540 game instances played when the perceived agent was a computer and 228 data points
when the perceived agent was a person.
5.1. Results and discussion
The results presented in this section are all statistically signiﬁcant using the pairwise sign test. This test takes as input
paired samples from two distributions and tests whether there is a difference in medians between the distributions [15].
The effect of a single factor is measured by considering all matched pairs of data points that differ only in that factor (e.g.,
(ABI = 1.0, level = 3, PP = person) vs (ABI = 3.5, level = 3, PP = person)). For example, to determine the effect of ABI, we
compared all data points with different ABI values but ﬁxed game level and perceived partner type.
The optimal policy for the principal player is to accept an interruption if its associated beneﬁt (ABI) is positive and to
reject otherwise. Table 1 shows interruption acceptance rates for different rounds and ABI values across game instances.
It is divided by perceived partner type (person or agent). As the results of Table 1 show, the utility of an interruption is
the major factor inﬂuencing the probability that an interruption will be accepted by a person. The interruption acceptance
rate increases signiﬁcantly as the beneﬁt of interruption rises from −1.5 to 1.0 (p < e−20, α = 0.001) and from 1.0 to 3.5
(p = 0.0013, α = 0.01). However the rise from 3.5 to 6.0 does not further improve the acceptance rate. Thus, these results
conﬁrm that people are successful at perceiving interruption beneﬁts above a threshold (in this case 3.5). Furthermore,
when an interruption is costly for the collaboration, people are signiﬁcantly more likely to reject the interruption. However,
subjects varied in their responses to interruptions offering slightly positive gains (i.e., ABI = 1.0), indicating the diﬃculty of
estimating the beneﬁt of interruption when its usefulness is not clear. These results indicate an asymmetry in the way sub-
6 In effect, we computed Eq. (20) using the algorithm presented by Kamar and Grosz [31]. For the case where there is only one interruption, this
algorithm gives the same result as the NED-DECOP algorithm.
7 This misinformation was approved by the committee for the use of human subjects at Harvard University.
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Acceptance rate of interruptions.
PP:Computer Round 3 Round 5 Round 7
ABI −1.5 0.16 0.16 0.41
ABI 1.0 0.27 0.7 0.81
ABI 3.5 0.91 0.97 0.79
ABI 6.0 0.91 0.95 0.95
PP:Person
ABI −1.5 0 0.11 0.44
ABI 1.0 0.72 0.94 1
ABI 3.5 0.91 0.94 0.88
ABI 6.0 1 0.88 1
Fig. 6. Effect of interruption beneﬁt and perceived partner type on interruption acceptance rate.
jects perceive ABI in that interruptions offering small losses are clearly rejected, but subjects do not respond to interruptions
with small gains so uniformly.
Fig. 6 summarizes the acceptance rates of interruption as a function of the actual beneﬁt of interruption and perceived
partner type (person vs. computer). We divide the ﬁgure into three regions of interruption beneﬁts: small losses (Region 1),
small gains (Region 2), and large gains (Region 3). The analysis shows that for losses (Region 1) and for large gains (Re-
gion 3), changing the perceived partner type does not affect the likelihood that the interruption will be accepted. In contrast,
for interruptions offering small gains (Region 2), the acceptance rate is signiﬁcantly larger if the perceived partner type is a
person (p = 3× 10−5, α = 0.001).
The results above show that when the beneﬁt of interruption is straightforward, people do not care whether the initiator
of the interruption is a person or a computer. However, for those cases in which the beneﬁt of interruption is ambiguous,
people are more likely to accept interruptions that originate from other people. These results align with recent studies
showing that mutual cooperation is more diﬃcult to achieve in human–computer settings as compared to settings involving
people exclusively [53].
Fig. 7 shows the effect of interruption timing (the round of the game) on people’s acceptance rates for interruptions of
ambiguous beneﬁt. We expected that interruptions occurring late in the game (i.e., with fewer rounds left to play) would be
more likely to be accepted when they incur positive beneﬁt, and rejected when incurring a loss. However, as shown by the
ﬁgure, as the game round increases, so does the acceptance rate for interruptions of both small losses (ABI −1.5) and small
gains (ABI 1.0). There is a signiﬁcant increase in the acceptance rate when the game round increases from 3 to 5 (p = 0.002,
α = 0.01) and from 5 to 7 (p < 10−6, α = 0.001).
Given our hypothesis about the effect of the game round on the interruption acceptance rate, we considered the inﬂuence
of the following factors on people’s decisions to accept or reject interruption requests: the actual beneﬁt of an interruption
to the person (to the person’s individual task performance), and the actual beneﬁt of an interruption to the agent (to the
agent’s task performance).
The interruption game is collaborative; players share a joint reward function. However, an interruption offers different
beneﬁts (or costs) to the players’ individual task performances, which suggests that the cost of an interruption to the princi-
pal’s individual task (−ABIP ) may explain the correlation between the acceptance rate and the game round for interruptions
of small gains and losses. We explored this hypothesis on the dataset collected from the interruption game.
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We refer to ABIP and −ABIP as the beneﬁt and cost of an interruption to the principal, respectively. As shown in Fig. 7,
the cost of interruption to the principal (−ABIP ) decreases as game round increases. Thus, for interruptions of ambiguous
beneﬁt, we found that the acceptance rate is negatively correlated with the cost of interruption to the principal. In addition,
the beneﬁt of the interruption to the principal (ABIP ) was a better predictor of the acceptance rate than ABIA , the beneﬁt
of interruption to the agent (logistic regression SE = 0.05, R2 = 0.19, p < 0.001). Thus, human subjects tend to overestimate
the importance of their own beneﬁt from interruptions as compared to the beneﬁt for the agent. Consequently, the beneﬁt
of an interruption to the person may be weighted more in people’s decision-making than the beneﬁt of the interruption,
and people may be more likely to accept an interruption with high ABIP among interruptions with identical beneﬁt. This
ﬁnding resonates with research in behavioral economics that has repeatedly demonstrated that people care more about
their own outcome in non-collaborative settings. Our own research generalizes this trend to collaborative settings. It was
surprising to us that people cared more about their own task even with a collaborative activity, despite the lack of material
beneﬁt. A possible explanation is people’s possible lack of trust of computer agents, which has been documented in the
behavioral sciences literature (see for example, van Wissen et al. [63]). Another possible explanation for people valuing
their individually assigned tasks more is the “endowment effect” in which people overestimate the value of objects and
tasks that are assigned to them [30].
The study in Section 6 further investigates these conjectures by applying learning techniques on the data to better un-
derstand the correlation of acceptance rate with the cost of interruption to the person. This study is supported by several
responses to post-experiment survey questions regarding people’s strategies for accepting interruptions. Representative an-
swers include:
(1) If the agent was in the totally wrong direction and I had several moves left, I would allow the interruption. (2) I al-
ways wanted the sure thing for myself. (3) If the collaborator was way off in knowing and had enough moves to likely
catch it after I told the location, I accepted. If it compromised my ability to get my goal, I declined.
6. Learning people’s responses
As the work presented in the last section demonstrates, if the beneﬁt of information exchange actions is not clearly
positive or negative (a large gain or a loss) then people’s behavior diverges from the purely rational behavior as predicted by
the NED-DECOP algorithm. In this section, we deploy machine learning to build a model able to predict people’s responses
to information exchange actions. These learned models can then be used to predict which interruptions are likely to be
accepted by people. The NED-DECOP algorithm plays a key role in learning; it computes the value of the features used in
the learning.
We compared two machine learning algorithms, Naive Bayes and perceptrons. These particular algorithms have been
shown to do well for small training sets, and their assumptions are reasonable ones for the interruption game setting.
The Naive Bayes algorithm assumes that all features are independent of each other given the class. For example, in the
interruption game, given that it is known whether an interruption is accepted, the distance between the principal’s position
and its goal and the distance between the agent’s position and its goal are independent. The perceptron algorithm provides
a weighting over the feature set.8 This allows the algorithm to learn the extent to which people care about such factors
8 We employed a variant of the perceptron algorithm that uses a soft-margin technique which was been shown to be robust to noise [34].
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Comparison of Naive Bayes classiﬁers with baseline classiﬁers.
Model Accuracy
General NB (domain features) 0.80
General NB (full features) 0.85
Personalized NB (domain features) 0.75
Personalized NB (full features) 0.77
Majority Rule 0.71
ABI Rule 0.82
Table 3
Comparison of Perceptron classiﬁers with baseline classiﬁers.
Model Accuracy
General Perceptron (domain features) 0.81
General Perceptron (full features) 0.84
Personalized Perceptron (domain features) 0.75
Personalized Perceptron (full features) 0.77
Majority Rule 0.71
ABI Rule 0.82
General Perceptron (individual beneﬁts) 0.82
Personalized Perceptron (individual beneﬁts) 0.84
as their own beneﬁt and the other player’s beneﬁt from interruption requests. After learning, we evaluated the classiﬁers’
predictions as compared to people’s actual responses.
Two types of classiﬁers were used: a general classiﬁer which was trained on data from multiple participants; and, a
personalized classiﬁer which was trained on a particular person’s data. Given people’s diverse responses in the interruption
game, as reported in the last section, we expected that if there were suﬃcient training data, personalized classiﬁers would
outperform general classiﬁers when predicting an individual persons behavior in the game.
For each classiﬁer we used two types of features. Domain-dependent features represent characteristics of the interrup-
tion game. They include the following features: the perceived participant type (whether computer or human); the current
round h; the Manhattan distance between the principal’s position phP and its goal g
h
P ; the Manhattan distance between
the agent’s position ghA and its goal g
h
A ; the expected distance between the agent’s location and its goal location according
to its belief bh . Domain-independent features are general attributes relating to agents’ information exchange actions. These
include the actual beneﬁt of the interruption (ABI) and its two components: the actual beneﬁt to the principal (ABIP ); and
the actual beneﬁt to the agent (ABIA ). The values of these features for a particular game are computed by the NED-DECOP
algorithm.
We trained classiﬁers that used only domain-dependent features, as well as classiﬁers that used both domain-dependent
and domain-independent features. We refer to the latter as using the “full feature set”. We studied whether using the
domain-independent features improved performance for the classiﬁers.
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the performance of the Naive Bayes and Perceptron classiﬁers respectively. We measured
the accuracy of all classiﬁers in predicting people’s responses using ten-fold cross-validation. All reported results were
signiﬁcant using non-parametric paired tests. The tables also show the performance of two baseline strategies: accepting an
interruption when the ABI measure is positive (referred as the ABI rule) and choosing the response in the training set that
is in the majority (referred as the majority rule).
As shown in the tables, the general classiﬁer using the full feature set performed signiﬁcantly better than the other
classiﬁers for all measures (p = 0.012, α = 0.05). The ABI rule did better than (or as well as) all the other classiﬁers using
domain-dependent features, not taking into account the full general classiﬁers.
The personalized classiﬁers were outperformed by both the ABI rule and the general classiﬁers. A possible reason for this
result is the data scarcity for individual subjects; we collected an average of 27 game instances for each subject. It may be
diﬃcult to learn a personal perceptron over the full feature set with this much data.
Due to the negative results for learning personal classiﬁers over a large feature set, we focus on learning personal
classiﬁers over a small feature space. Based on results in the social preference literature in Behavioral Economics [14], we
conjectured that people differ in the importance they gave to their value from an interruption request and the importance
that they gave to the other participant. To examine this conjecture, we generated general and personal perceptron classiﬁers
trained only on the individual beneﬁt from an interruption request for each participant (ABIp and ABIA ). The results are
presented in Table 3. The personalized classiﬁer trained over ABIP and ABIA was able to perform as well as the general
perceptron trained over the full feature set.
Lastly, we found that the difference in performance (measured as compared to using the ABI rule) of the best general
classiﬁer versus the best personalized classiﬁer was not consistent across subjects. The best general classiﬁer (i.e., the Naive
Bayesian algorithm with full features) improved classiﬁcation accuracy for 42% of the subjects in comparison to the ABI rule,
whereas the best personal classiﬁer (the perceptron algorithm with individual utilities) improved performance for only 27%
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Comparison of the Mixture model with the best performing models.
Model Accuracy
ABI Rule 0.82
General Naive Bayes (full features) 0.85
Personal Perceptron (individual utilities) 0.84
Mixture 0.88
of the subjects. These differences suggest trying a hybrid approach or a mixture model that chooses whether to apply the
personalized or general classiﬁer on a single data point based on their performance on the remaining dataset. We applied
leave-one-out cross validation on the dataset. We compare the accuracy of the mixture model with other classiﬁers in
Table 4. As shown by the table, the mixture model was able to perform signiﬁcantly better than the best Naive Bayes and
Perceptron classiﬁers.
7. Deploying NED-MDPs in agent design
In the previous sections, we showed how NED-MDPs, the NED-DECOP algorithm, and machine learning could be used
to build models for information exchange for the interruption game. NED-MDPs, the algorithm and the methodology ap-
ply more broadly. We illustrate this generalization to collaborative settings in which people and computers coordinate by
providing a brief description of their use for the example from Section 3.1 of a collaboration between a person writing
an academic paper, and a computer agent assisting the person by autonomously obtaining bibliographic data. These two
participants share the common goal of completing a document, but each of them works largely independently on individual
tasks such as composing paragraphs or searching for bibliographical information.
To build a decision-making model for this domain, a designer would need to specify the actions, rewards and transition
functions for the agent, the person and their joint efforts. For example, the individual actions of the person include writing
the paper, and the coordination actions for the person include supplying keywords to the computer and selecting the
appropriate bibliographical information from the available options. The individual actions of the computer include searching
for citation information on the web, and the coordination actions for the computer represent when to ask the user for
keywords, what keywords to ask for, and choosing which bibliographical options to display to the user. The reward function
for the person’s task reﬂects the person’s satisfaction from the quality of paragraphs, while the reward for the computer
agent’s task reﬂects the agent’s success in retrieving the appropriate bibliographical information. The transition functions of
the person and the agent represent the dynamic nature of their individual tasks. For example, the user may not know what
to write next, and the system may have uncertainty about search results. The transition functions of the person and the
agent have a nearly-decomposable structure in that their individual progress is independent of each other’s task and action
when they are not exchanging information. On the other hand, a communication action may impede the performance of
both participants because the system needs to suspend its search for bibliographical data when it queries the user, and the
user may be distracted by the query. Once actions, rewards and transitions are speciﬁed, the designer can construct the
NED-MDP for the domain.
Using this NED-MDP, the NED-DECOP algorithm can compute baseline strategies for the group (agent and principal).
Following these strategies, the computer agent could, for example, request keywords from the user as well as ask him/her
to choose citations from a list. Similarly, the algorithm can be used to compute the beneﬁt of coordination actions to the
group from the person’s perspective (e.g., ABI) and individual components of this beneﬁt to the group participants (e.g.,
ABIP and ABIA ).
To complete the agent design, a designer would undertake empirical studies in which the agent used the baseline strate-
gies to coordinate with a representative sample of users, and people’s responses to these requests would be used to train
classiﬁers to distinguish interruptions that are likely to be accepted by the people. The domain-independent features for the
classiﬁers would include the beneﬁts of a coordination action for individuals and for the group as computed from the per-
son’s perspective (e.g., ABIP , ABIA and ABI), just as in the interruption game. The domain-dependent features might include
such characteristics as the length of the text, the number of citation keywords. The resulting learned model provides the
designer with a system component that can be used to identify useful opportunities for information exchange.
8. Conclusion and future work
This paper demonstrates that decomposition, which has been shown repeatedly to be important for reducing the com-
plexity of AI reasoning systems [61], can play a signiﬁcant role in overcoming the general intractability of collaborative
decision-making in the context of information-exchange. It introduces the concept of a nearly decomposable decision-
making problem and demonstrates that decisions about information exchange between people and computer systems can be
modeled in this way when their collaborative activity is composed largely of individual tasks with a need to coordinate only
occasionally. Although information exchange is not frequent, it remains crucial for their joint performance on the shared
activity. Even though it is infrequent, reasoning about the utility of information exchange actions on the collaboration may
be intractable with general approaches.
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nearly decomposable structure of these decision-making problems. It presents a novel algorithm, which exploits the special
structure of NED-MDPs, for eﬃciently computing agents’ strategies for information exchange. The eﬃcacy of the model and
algorithm are demonstrated on an interruption management problem, a special case of an information exchange task. The
paper also introduces a new methodology for generating coordination strategies for agents, one which proceeds from a fully
rational baseline model of decision-making to comparing the behavior this model engenders with people’s responses to it
and then, using machine learning, constructs predictive models of their responses.
These results may be extended in several ways: First, the algorithm model can be extended to account for the discrepancy
in the information that agents have about the world. To address the added complexity implied by this extension, sampling
methods like Monte Carlo tree search might be used to improve the eﬃciency of the algorithm. Such techniques also
allow the algorithm to be applied to a broader range of collaborative settings [35]. Agents can be designed based on
iterative application of the methodology; such agents would revise their coordination strategies based on their interactions
with people. These agents could be developed not only for the interruption game, but also for other collaborative settings
involving information exchange. The techniques and approaches presented in this paper suggest that analyzing problems
to ﬁnd natural places for problem decomposition might be used to reduce complexity and lead to agents better able to
coordinate with people in a range of decision-making domains.
Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 1 (by induction).
Proof. Basis: At h = H , the end of the time horizon is reached. We apply the original Dec-MDP value function given in
Eq. (1):
V π
(
sH1 , s
H
2
)= R(sH1 , sH2 )
We apply the reward independence property presented in Eq. (3):
= R1
(
sH1
)+ R2(sH2 )
= V π1
(
sH1 , s
H
2
)+ V π2 (sH1 , sH2 )
Inductive step: For each h + 1< H , we assume that:
V π
(
sh+11 , s
h+1
2
)= V π1 (sh+11 , sh+12 )+ V π2 (sh+11 , sh+12 )
We generate the value function for time step h by applying Eq. (1) from Section 3.1: (28)
V π
(
sh1, s
h
2
)= R(sh1, sh2)+ ∑
(sh+11 ,s
h+1
2 )
T
((
sh+11 , s
h+1
2
) ∣∣ (sh1, sh2),π(sh1, sh2)) · V π (sh+11 , sh+12 )
We apply the semi-transition and reward independence properties of the NED-MDP
formalization given in Eqs. (2) and (3):
= R1
(
sh1
)+ R2(sh2)+ ∑
(sh+11 ,s
h+1
2 )
T1
(
sh+11
∣∣ sh1,π(sh1, sh2)) · T2(sh+12 ∣∣ sh2,π(sh1, sh2))
· (V π1 (sh+11 , sh+12 )+ V π2 (sh+11 , sh+12 ))
= R1
(
sh1
)+ ∑
(sh+11 ,s
h+1
2 )
T1
(
sh+11
∣∣ sh1,π(sh1, sh2)) · T2(sh+12 ∣∣ sh2,π(sh1, sh2)) · V π1 (sh+11 , sh+12 )
+ R2
(
sh2
)+ ∑
(sh+11 ,s
h+1
2 )
T1
(
sh+11
∣∣ sh1,π(sh1, sh2)) · T2(sh+12 ∣∣ sh2,π(sh1, sh2)) · V π2 (sh+11 , sh+12 )
= V π1
(
sh1, s
h
2
)+ V π2 (sh1, sh2) (29)
The derivation of the value function (Eq. (6)) is straightforward given that the value of the joint policy is aggregate of
the values of individual policies, and that the transition function is semi-independent. 
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